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AbstractThis article presents a game theoretical model of union organization that highlights the role played by
efficiency and asymmetric information as determinants of unionization and questions commonly held
assumptions about the effect of firm profitability on unionization decisions. In the model, employers set
wages taking into account the effect of their choices on workers' incentives to unionize. As a result of
employers' strategic wage setting, collective bargaining emerges in equilibrium only if it increases surplus
or if there is asymmetric information about the consequences of unionization. While unionization is usually
assumed to be more likely in more profitable firms, the model shows that the probability of unionization
will be higher in firms with lower rents. It also shows that the union wage premium and unionization will
tend to be negatively correlated.
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1. Introduction
In countries with decentralized collective bargaining systems, such as the U.S. or Great
Britain, collective bargaining takes place only if workers request to be represented by a trade
union and the firm employing them agrees to bargain with one. Since we observe both union and
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nonunion firms, the challenge for the researcher is to explain why collective bargaining emerges
in some firms and not in others. To address this question, this paper presents a model in which
849P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868unionization is determined as the equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction between a firm
and its workers.
The prevalent view among economists is that unions' main role is to increase the wages of their
members. Thus, it is often argued that unionization will be more likely in more profitable firms,
since it is in those firms where the expected wage gains from unionization are larger. This
argument, which focuses on workers' incentives to unionize, has been criticized on the grounds
that greater expected wage gains will, other things equal, also strengthen firms' incentives to resist
unionization (Freeman, 1986). Therefore, an alternative view stresses the costs of unionization to
workers–especially those that stem from employers' actions–and casts doubt on the sign of the
effect that profitability may have on unionization. Finally, a third view, while acknowledging
unions' role in increasing the wages of their members, contends that unions play other roles that
may be conducive to efficiency. Replacing individual contracting with collective contracting can
economize in transaction costs and may lead to improved governance of the employment
relationship for a variety of reasons (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Williamson, 1985). Thus, a key
determinant of unionization, according to this view, will be unions' potential to contribute to
workplace efficiency.
This article presents a formal model of unionization that draws from these three views. In it,
firms may differ in the rents that can be shared with workers; in the fraction of those rents that
workers can appropriate by unionizing; in the costs of unionization for workers; and in whether
unionization results in efficiency gains or losses. Therefore, the model allows us to assess the
impact that firm profitability, the union wage premium and the effect of unions on efficiency will
have on the probability of unionization.
The model has three key ingredients. The first one is strategic wage setting: when employers
set wages, they take into account the effect of their choice on workers' incentives to unionize.
Although present in prior analyses of the effect of unions on wages, strategic wage setting has
often been overlooked in the discussion about the determinants of unionization. The second key
feature of the model is that information about the consequences of unionization is allowed to be
asymmetrically distributed between workers and their employer. While unorganized workers will
have, at best, a noisy assessment of the firm's ability to generate rents and, thus, of their expected
gains from unionization, the very nature of the managerial role involves acquiring and processing
information about the firm's current state and future prospects, and the manager's actions–some
of which are unobservable to workers–largely determine those prospects. Therefore, the model
also analyzes unionization when the employer is better informed than workers about the firm's
prospects. Finally, reflecting the lack of agreement about the efficiency effects of unions, unions
are allowed to have either a positive or a negative effect on surplus.
The model shows that if workers and their employer have the same information about the
benefits and costs of unionization, the only determinants of unionization will be the union's effect
on efficiency and the costs of organization to workers: unionization takes place in equilibrium if
and only if it generates efficiency gains that exceed the organization costs. As long as
unionization is potentially profitable for workers, other factors such as the firm's profitability or
the union's bargaining strength will not play any role in determining unionization.
Results change greatly once asymmetries of information are considered. First, asymmetric
information allows unionization to take place even if it is inefficient, and may preclude union
formation when it is efficient. And, second, if unionization is inefficient, it will be more likely in
firms with worse prospects. This result questions the commonly-held assumption that
2
unionization will be more likely where rents are larger: although the presence of quasi-rents is
necessary for unionization to be possible, the model predicts that firms with larger quasi-rents are
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research on the impact of unionization on wages and firm performance. One of the main obstacles
faced by this strand of research is that union and nonunion firms may be different in dimensions
other than their union status. If not accounted for, these differences may result in biased estimates
of the effects of unionization. Since unionization is generally assumed in empirical work to be
more likely in more profitable firms or in firms that would in any case pay high wages, it is often
argued that the negative effect of unions on profits that is usually found is underestimated and that
the union wage premium is overestimated. The model presented here shows that biases due to
unobserved differences between union and nonunion firms are likely to emerge. It also shows that
they may have the opposite sign to the one that is usually hypothesized in empirical work.
The model also allows us to analyze the relationship between the probability of unionization
and the union wage premium. While a demand-driven explanation of unionization would imply
that unionization is more likely when the union wage premium is high, the view that focuses on
employers' resistance to unionization could yield the opposite prediction. In this paper, both
unionization and the wage premium are determined in equilibrium, and they are shown to move in
opposite directions as the values of other parameters change. Thus, the model predicts a negative
correlation between the two variables.
Although there are very few formal models of unionization, reduced-form models are often
used in empirical work to guide in the specification of estimating equations. In studies using
aggregate data, estimating equations for the extent of unionization are often interpreted as
equilibrium equations of a market of union services, while when worker-level data are used, the
union status of workers is usually supposed to depend on workers' demand for union jobs and on
their ability to find them, although the two factors are rarely identified separately (Farber, 1990).
More closely related to the concerns of the present article are studies that focus on the
determinants of unionization at the firm level. These studies typically assume a function that
relates employers' actions (such as wages, Farber, 2005; or anti-union activities, Freeman and
Kleiner, 1990a) to the probability of unionization. There are, however, few instances in which
unionization is explicitly derived from the optimizing behavior of employers and workers. Lazear
(1983) provided a model in which unionization and wages were determined simultaneously in
equilibrium. In his model, workers announce an industry-wide wage demand, and employers
decide whether to accept that demand or to reject it at a cost. The model thus provides a better
description of a unionized industry with centralized bargaining, in which employers can deviate
from the collective bargaining agreement at a cost, than of an industry with either no or
decentralized bargaining, in which unorganized workers decide at the firm level whether or not to
unionize. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) developed a model in which the structure of collective
bargaining was determined in equilibrium and was shown to depend upon technological
parameters. Although their focus was on the choice between encompassing unions versus
separate unions for different types of workers, their model can also be interpreted as providing
conditions under which individual or collective bargaining is optimal for workers. Apart from the
work of Lazear (1983) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988), a series of papers (Booth, 1985; Naylor
and Cripps, 1993; Naylor and Raaum, 1993; Corneo, 1995) has developed theoretical models of
union membership that analyze the free-riding problem that arises when workers can benefit from
the wage increases bargained by the union without becoming members. Although related to the
present paper in their goal to explicitly model unionization decisions at the firm level, the focus of
these articles is different in that they typically assume the existence of union-management
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bargaining and try to explain individual membership decisions given that all workers receive the
wages negotiated by the union. These papers, which, in some cases (Naylor and Raaum, 1993;
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stressed the role of social custom as the solution to the free-riding problem. More closely related
to the approach of the present paper is an article by Corneo and Lucifora (1997), where the
authors present a game-theoretical model in which a local union with a predetermined level of
membership must decide whether to conduct local wage negotiations, and the employer makes a
wage offer taking into account that a low wage may lead the union to press for wage bargaining.
The model presented here differs from the literature on the free-riding problem in that its starting
point is a situation in which there is no collective bargaining or union presence and its goal is,
precisely, to explain the conditions under which collective bargaining will emerge.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 solves it when there
is complete information, and Section 4 analyzes the consequences of the existence of
informational asymmetries. Finally, Section 5 analyzes the model's implications and the
available empirical evidence, and Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
Consider a firm that lives for two periods. In the first period, the firm offers a wagew0 to a pool of
identical workers who can obtain a wage w outside the firm. If workers accept the wage offer,
production takes place, workers acquire firm-specific skills through on-the-job learning, and revenues
V0 are generated; otherwise, the firm closes and obtains zero revenues. I assume, for simplicity, that
the firm has a fixed number of jobs and that, if production takes place, all the jobs are filled.
At the beginning of the second period, the firm offers a wagew to its employees,who can: i) accept
the offered wage, ii) form a union to renegotiate the wage, or iii) leave the firm and earnw. If workers
accept the offer, they are paidw and generate revenuesV; if they form a union, they incur organization
costs per worker c, and collective bargaining takes place, resulting in revenues V u and a union wage
wu. Finally, if workers leave the firm, alternative workers are hired. These workers are paid their
reservation wagew and generate revenuesV. Since alternative workers lack the firm-specific skills of
incumbents,V bV. I will denote byWandW u the total wage bills if workers accept thewage offer and
if they unionize, respectively. Analogously,Cwill denote total organization costs for workers. For the
sake of notational simplicity–and without loss of generality–I will assume throughout the paper that
w=V =0.
It will also be assumed that there is no time discounting. The timing of events is depicted in
Fig. 1. Below, I discuss some of the model's assumptions in greater detail.Fig. 1. Time-line.
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2.1. Union organization
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assumptions reflect the institutional framework of countries like the U.S. or Great Britain, in
which, on the one hand, there is no mandate for firms to set up any sort of body representing
workers, while, on the other hand, firms are obliged to recognize and bargain with a union if a
majority of workers express their will to be represented by one. Employers' obligation to
recognize a union, however, does not imply that the process of unionization is costless for
workers. Before a majority of workers can voice their wish to obtain union representation, at least
some workers need to acquire information about the process governing union recognition and the
potential costs and benefits that would stem from it; this information needs to be shared with co-
workers and some form of consultation is required to assess the interests of the majority. All these
activities are costly and subject to potentially severe free-riding problems (Booth, 1985; Corneo,
1995). Moreover, they can be made more costly by employers by legal means (like, say, appealing
union recognition decisions) or illegal ones, such as discharging employees supportive of
unionization. Even if some of the organizing activities can be carried out by an established union,
the costs incurred would still be ultimately borne by workers in terms of initiation fees and union
dues. The actual process by which workers acquire union representation is, thus, complex, and is
beyond the scope of this paper to model it. For the purposes of this paper, what matters is that
unionization entails costs for workers and that workers take into account these costs when they
decide whether to unionize.
2.2. Bargaining
Because of the firm-specific skills acquired by workers in the first period, the revenues that the
firm can obtain in the second period if it employs incumbent workers are larger than those that
could be obtained by hiring alternative workers.1 Therefore, workers can attempt to bargain with
the firm for a share of the quasi-rents that result from their firm-specific skills. Given the
simplifying assumption that both V and w are zero, the size of these quasi-rents is simply V, so I
will use the terms quasi-rents, revenues, or value interchangeably to refer to V. The model
assumes that bargaining is possible only if workers negotiate collectively with management. This
is a simplifying assumption: all that is needed is that workers' bargaining power is greater if they
bargain collectively.
If unionization takes place, the union and management bargain over the wage. While different
bargaining models would generate different predictions about V u and wu, it is not necessary for
our purposes to commit to a particular model of union-management bargaining. When workers
decide whether to unionize or when the firm decides what wage to offer, all that matters to them is
the expected outcomes of the bargaining process: wu and V u. Therefore, instead of modelling
how these variables are determined, I take them as parameters and impose the mildest possible
restrictions on the values that they can take. Hence, the model's results apply to any bargaining
model whose outcomes satisfy those restrictions. Note also that we do not have to make any
specific assumptions about the objectives of the union officials who bargain with management if
the union forms. The impact of those objectives on the bargaining outcome is already
incorporated in wu.
1 Firm-specific skills do not play any role in the model other than ensuring that incumbent employees are more valuable
than outsiders. Any other sort of firing or hiring costs would yield the same implications.
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2.3. Unionization and efficiency
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collective bargaining leads to inefficient input choices, as in so-called “monopoly union” or
“right-to-manage” models) or zero (“efficient bargaining” models).2 It has long been argued,
however, that there are different ways in which unions may improve efficiency. For example,
collective contracting through the union may economize in contracting costs and lead to better
decisions regarding many aspects of workplace organization that have a public good nature (e.g.,
working conditions, pension plans).3 The empirical evidence on the efficiency effects of unions–
which has focused mostly on productivity–is, however, not conclusive. Reflecting the lack of
consensus about the effects of unionization on efficiency, in the model, the difference V− (V u−C )
is allowed to be positive, negative or zero, although the case V− (V u−C )N0 will receive special
attention when the effects of asymmetric information are considered.
2.4. Other simplifying assumptions
Employment is assumed to be fixed in the model. Since it is plausible–and predicted by some
of the most commonly used collective bargaining models–that unionization may affect
employment, I discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in Section 3. For tractability,
it is also assumed that workers are identical and are treated identically by the firm and, in case of
unionization, by the union.
3. Efficient unionization
When setting the second period wage, employers will take into account how this wage affects
workers' incentives to unionize. If there is perfect information about the bargaining outcome that
would result if workers unionized, so that workers know that their net payoff from unionization is
W u−C, unionization will take place unless W≥W u−C. Since employers set W, unionization
will thus occur only if paying W u−C is more costly to the employer than allowing unionization
and incurring wage costs W u. As long as C≥0, this can only happen if unions increase value.
Proposition 1 states this result (all proofs are in the appendix). It is worth noting that firms in
which W u−Cb0 are not unionizable, in the sense that workers would never unionize
independently of the wage offer made by the firm. In what follows, I will, unless otherwise
noticed, restrict attention to unionizable firms, that is, those with W u−CN0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Wu is observed both by workers and by the employer. Then:
1. If V u−VbC, at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the firm offers W0⁎=− (W u−C ) and
W⁎=W u−C, and workers accept the wage offers on the equilibrium path.
2. If V u−VNC, at any subgame perfect equilibrium, the firm offers W0⁎⁎=− (W u−C ),
W⁎⁎≤W u−C, and workers unionize.
It has long been argued (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Williamson, 1985) that the effect of
unions on workplace efficiency may be an important factor determining unionization. Proposition
2 See Booth (1995), chapters 4 and 5, for a review of the main collective bargaining models.
3 Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Booth (1995) provide discussions of the potential efficiency effects of unions and the
empirical evidence on those effects.
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1 shows that, in the absence of informational asymmetries, efficiency and the costs of
organization to workers are the only factors determining unionization. This is a strong result in
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will not take place where it would destroy value or merely redistribute surplus from firm owners
to workers. Since usual theoretical models of collective bargaining predict no or a negative effect
of unions on efficiency, this result implies that no unionization would take place under the
assumptions made by those models. The result is also strong in that it implies that factors other
than unions' impact on efficiency, such as the firm's revenues or the union's bargaining power, do
not have a direct causal effect on the probability of unionization among unionizable firms. These
factors will be correlated with unionization only insofar they are associated with unions' ability to
generate efficiency gains or with the costs of organization to workers.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed for simplicity that the level of employment is fixed. The
logic behind Proposition 1–namely, that it is cheaper for employers to pay workers to dissuade
them from unionizing than letting unionization happen as long as unions do not increase surplus–
still applies if we relax this assumption. To see this, suppose that unionization led to a level of
employment Lu lower than the initial one, L. This would translate into lower revenues if the union
forms (V ubV) and would imply that only a proportion Lu/L of workers stays at the firm and earns
the union wage. Assuming that all workers have the same probability of being laid off in case of
unionization and letting c represent the per worker cost of organization, workers' expected utility
from unionization would be
Wu
L
−c.4 Therefore, the firm could avoid unionization if it set a wage
w ¼ Wu
L
c, that is, if its total wage costs were L
Wu
L
c
 
Wu C. It follows that the firm can earn
V−W u+C if it avoids unionization and V u−W u if a union forms, which brings us back
to the analysis in Proposition 1.
It is also worth noting that Proposition 1 implies that the first-period wage is negative. This
result is, in part, an artifact of the assumptions that w=0 and that there is no time discounting.
More importantly, whether or not the firm can recover through a low w0 the rents that it has to
grant workers in the second period is immaterial for the results. Since the first period plays no
significant role in the analysis, I will omit it from the discussion hereafter.
4. Asymmetric information and inefficient unionization
As argued in the introduction, it is reasonable to expect that management will have better
information than workers about the firm's prospects. This section analyzes the impact of this
asymmetry of information on unionization decisions.5 To do this, the information structure is now
as follows. In the first period, workers and management know that the firm can generate revenues
V0 and have the same information about the revenues that a skilled worker would generate in the
second period. In particular, it is known that firms can be either high-value (H ) or low-value (L),
with second-period revenues given by VHNVL and V H
u NV L
u. The wage bills that would result
from unionization in each type of firm, WH
u NW L
u, are also commonly known. Finally, workers
and firms know the true distribution of types, given by q, the probability that a firm is high-value.
At the beginning of the second period, after workers have accumulated firm-specific human
capital, management learns the firm's type and makes a new wage offer to the employed workers.
4 For simplicity, it was assumed that w 0, so workers' expected utility from unionization is wu
Lu
L
þw¯ð1 Lu
L
Þ c Wu
L
c.
5 The relevance of asymmetric information in unionized settings has been previously highlighted by theoretical models
of strikes (see Kennan and Wilson, 1993, for a review).
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Workers then decide whether to accept the wage offer or to organize a union. If a union forms,
union officials are able to observe the firm's type, so the negotiated wage is W u in high-value
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firms andW L
u in low-value firms. Specialized union officials have the time and skill to investigate
the firm's prospects, so it is natural to assume that they have better information than unorganized
workers. The assumption that their information is as good as management's is made for
simplicity. The results would not change in any qualitative form if it were assumed, instead, that
the union has the same information as unorganized workers, that it observes an additional noisy
signal, or that some information is revealed in the course of bargaining. Fig. 2 depicts the timing
of events when there is asymmetric information.
In what follows, I will consider only equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. Considering
equilibria in which firms randomize between different wage offers increases the number of
equilibria, but the additional equilibria do not exhibit features different from those displayed by
pure strategy equilibria nor provide new insights. The probability with which workers organize if
the wageW is offered (that is, workers' behavior strategy in the second period) will be denoted by
σ (W ), and ρ (W ) will denote the probability workers assign to the firm being high-value, given
that a wage W has been offered. Thus, ρ represents workers' beliefs about the relationship
between wage offers and firm types. The equilibrium concept will be the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, page 325):
Definition 1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a strategy profile (σ⁎, (WL⁎, WH⁎ )) and
posterior beliefs by workers ρ⁎ such that:
D.1. For all W, σ⁎ (W )∈arg maxσ σ[ρ⁎(W )WHu +(1−ρ⁎ (W ))W Lu−C]+ (1−σ)W.
D.2. W i⁎∈arg maxW σ⁎ (W )(V iu−W iu)+ (1−σ⁎ (W ))(Vi−W ), for i=L, H.
D.3. ρ⁎ (W )=q if W=WL⁎=WH⁎ ; ρ⁎ (W )=1 if W=WH⁎≠WL⁎; ρ⁎ (W )=0 if W=WL⁎≠WH⁎ ; and
ρ⁎ (W )∈ [0, 1], otherwise.
The first two conditions require workers and the firm to play best responses to each other's
strategy. The third condition requires workers' beliefs to be derived from the prior distribution and
from the firm's equilibrium strategy using Bayes' rule whenever possible (that is, whenever a
wage is set by at least one type of firm in equilibrium).
4.1. Inefficient unionization
Under complete information, unionization does not take place if it is inefficient. Given the lack
of conclusive evidence of a positive and substantial impact of unionization on efficiency and theFig. 2. Time-line. Asymmetric information.
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fact that usual bargaining models predict no or a negative effect on efficiency, this subsection
investigates whether asymmetric information can result in inefficient unionization. Throughout
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Assumption AS.1. V i
u−VibC for i=L, H.
To see how asymmetric information may alter the results of Section 3, first note that if no
information is credibly communicated to workers, they will unionize unless they are offered a
wage greater or equal to the ex ante expected wage from unionization net of organization costs,
W L
u+q(W H
u −W Lu)−C. This expected wage is greater than the wage that would allow a low-value
firm to avoid unionization if workers knew its type. Therefore, low-value firms would like to
reveal their low value to workers. However, they cannot credibly do so while at the same time
avoiding organization, since, in that case, it would be optimal for high-value firms to imitate them.
Therefore, if the ex ante expected wage from organization is high enough, so that avoiding
unionization becomes too costly, the only alternative for low-value firms is to trigger
organization, thus revealing their type to the union. Proposition 2 below shows that this intuitive
argument is correct if the following assumption holds:
Assumption AS.2. VH−V Hu +WHu NVL−V Lu+W Lu.
For a firm of type i that is paying a wage W, the cost of unionization is (Vi−W)− (Viu−Wiu).
Therefore, AS.2 states that unionization is more costly for high-value firms. If unions do not have
any efficiency effects, AS.2 simply amounts to WH
u NWL
u. If unions have a negative impact on
efficiency, AS.2 only requires that this impact is not significantly larger in low-value firms.
Proposition 2. Suppose that AS.1 and AS.2 hold. Then,
1. There exist separating equilibria.
2. In any separating equilibrium: WH⁎=WH
u −C; WL⁎≤W Lu−C; σ⁎ (WH⁎ )=0, σ⁎ (WL⁎ )=1 if
WL⁎bW L
u−C and σ⁎ (WL⁎ )∈ [σ, min{1, σ}] if WL⁎=W Lu−C, where:
ru
WuH−W
u
L
VH−VuH þ C þWuH−WuL
N0 ru
WuH−W
u
L
VL−VuL þ C
If AS.2 does not hold, then there are no separating equilibria.
Several remarks about Proposition 2 are in order. First, separation is possible in equilibrium
because AS.2 ensures that unionization is more costly for high-value firms and, thus, that they are
willing to pay more to avoid it. Second, high-value firms set the same wage as in the complete
information case and avoid unionization with certainty. Third, if WH
u −W LubVL−V Lu+C, then
σ⁎ (WL⁎)b1, and there are no equilibria with WL⁎bW L
u−C. However, if WHu −W Lu≥VL−V Lu+C,
then σ≥1, so there are equilibria with WL⁎=W Lu−C and σ⁎ (WL⁎)=1. In this case, there are also
equilibria with WL⁎bW L
u−C, which necessarily require σ⁎ (WL⁎)=1.6 Finally, the beliefs
supporting the equilibria are plausible and immune to the Intuitive Criterion, which is the most
common refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in signaling contexts.
Although separating equilibria like the ones described in Proposition 2 will exist whenever
AS.2 holds, if the ex ante expected union wage is relatively low and the revenue loss from union-
6 Note that W H
u −W Lu≥VL−V Lu +C can be rewritten as WH⁎≥WL⁎+VL−V Lu≡bWL, where bWL is the wage that
guarantees low-value firms a level of profits V L
u−W Lu independently of workers' decision. Thus, if WH⁎≥bW , low-value
firms prefer unionization to paying WH⁎.9
ization for low-value firms is relatively high, there will also exist equilibria in which low- and
high-value firms set the same wage and avoid unionization with positive probability. Proposition
857P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 8683 describes these pooling equilibria:
Proposition 3. Suppose that AS.1 holds. Then
1. If AS.2 holds, then there exist pooling equilibria if and only if
VL−ðqWuH þ ð1−qÞWuL−CÞzVuL−WuL ; ð1Þ
At these equilibria:WH⁎=WL⁎=Wp⁎≥Wp,σ⁎ (Wp⁎)=0 if Wp⁎NWp, and σ⁎ (Wp⁎)≤σ1 if Wp⁎=Wp,
where Wp≡qW Hu + (1−q )W Lu−C, and
r1u
ð1−qÞðWuH−WuL Þ
ð1−qÞðWuH−WuL Þ þ VH−VuH þ C
2. If AS.2 does not hold, then there always exist pooling equilibria with WH⁎=WL⁎=Wp⁎≥Wp,
σ⁎ (Wp⁎)=0 if Wp⁎NWp, and σ⁎ (Wp⁎)≤σ2 if Wp⁎=Wp, where
r2u
ð1−qÞðWuH−WuL Þ
ð1−qÞðWuH−WuL Þ þ VL−VuL þ C
Note that condition (1) simply states that low-value firms prefer to pay the ex ante expected
wage than to become unionized with certainty. If it holds, then, there exist pooling equilibria.
At these equilibria, low-value firms pay a wage higher than W L
u−C in exchange for a low
probability of unionization, and high-value firms take the risk of becoming unionized (when
σ⁎ (Wp⁎)N0) in exchange for a low wage. It is worth noting that whenever pooling equilibria
exist, there are pooling equilibria in which unionization is avoided with certainty.7
I argued above that it is reasonable to expect AS.2 to hold. For completeness, Propositions 2
and 3 also describe what would happen if AS.2 did not hold, that is, if unionization were more
costly in low-value firms. On the one hand, Proposition 2 shows that if AS.2 does not hold, there
are no separating equilibria, since it is always better for low-value firms to pay WH
u −C than to
allow unionization. This implies that there are no parameter values for which unionization is more
likely in high-value firms. On the other hand, Proposition 3 shows that if AS.2 does not hold
(which implies that (1) must hold), then there exist pooling equilibria.
4.2. Comparative statics
Propositions 2 and 3 show that in any possible equilibrium, either the probability of
unionization is the same in both types of firms (pooling equilibria), or it is higher in low-value
firms (separating equilibria). The following corollary summarizes these results:
Corollary 1. In any equilibrium, the probability of unionization in low value firms is greater or
equal than the probability of unionization in high value firms.
I analyze next how variables other than rents influence the probability of organization.
Given the multiplicity of equilibria, to derive comparative statics results, I will assume that for
7 While pooling equilibria with Wp⁎ Wp can be supported by plausible beliefs, equilibria with Wp⁎NW p require
workers to interpret wages that are lower than the equilibrium one as being more likely to be offered by high-value firms,
which may be an undesirable property.
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any vector of parameter values, workers and the firm coordinate on the equilibria that have the
minimum probability of unionization. In other words, players coordinate on those equilibria
858 P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868that, given AS.1, maximize rents. Therefore, it will be assumed that pooling equilibria with
σ(Wp⁎ )=0 are played whenever pooling equilibria exist, and separating equilibria with σ(WL)=
σ are played otherwise. It follows that the ex ante probability of unionization will be 0 if there
are pooling equilibria and (1−q)σ if there are no pooling equilibria. Inspection of Proposition 2
shows that σ is decreasing in C and (VH−V Hu ), and increasing in (W u−W Lu). Further,
inspection of AS.2 and condition (1) shows that reductions in C or (VL−V Lu) and increases in
(WH
u −WHu ) make pooling equilibria more likely.8 Therefore, we obtain the following corollary
of Propositions 2 and 3:
Corollary 2. The probability of organization is:
i. nondecreasing in ( W H
u −WHu )
ii. nonincreasing in C, ( VL−V Lu ), ( VH−V Hu )
Corollary 2 states, expectedly, that as organization costs or the efficiency losses due to
unionization increase, unionization becomes less likely. It also states that as the difference
between high- and low-value firms, as measured by (WH
u −W Lu), widens, the probability of
unionization increases. This is so for two reasons. On the one hand, it becomes more costly for
low-value firms to pay wage W p, making pooling equilibria less likely. On the other hand, it
makes it more profitable for high-value firms to imitate low-value ones when there is separation.
It follows that, to avoid imitation by high-value firms, the probability of unionization of low-value
firms in separating equilibria has to be higher.
It is worth remarking that restricting our attention to efficient equilibria simplifies the analysis,
but does not bias the results. Although the analysis is more cumbersome and less precise,
comparative statics can be performed without restricting the set of equilibria, and the conclusions
of Corollary 2 remain essentially unchanged.9
4.3. Union efficiency, firm value, and unionization
In the absence of a priori reasons to expect the sign of the effect of unions on efficiency
to be different in low- and high-value firms, the analysis of the impact of asymmetric
information on unionization has focused on the case in which this sign is independent of
firm profitability. Further, the sign of the effect has been assumed to be negative because of
theoretical and empirical arguments pointing at a negative or, at best, positive yet minor
impact of unionization on efficiency. For completeness, I briefly analyze here the effect that
asymmetric information would have on unionization both in the case in which unionization
8 Changes in (VH − V Hu ) affect condition AS.2. However, if (1) holds, then pooling equilibria will exist, independently
of the value of (VH −V Hu ), as long as AS.1 holds. On the other hand, if (1) does not hold, then AS.2 must obtain, so that
no pooling equilibria exist, independently of the value of (VH − V Hu ).
9 I have chosen efficiency as an equilibrium selection criterion mainly for the sake of brevity and expositional
simplicity. Equilibrium uniqueness, however, can also be achieved by means of a belief-based equilibrium refinement like
the D1 criterion (a refinement stricter than the Intuitive Criterion see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 11). Applying this
refinement, separating equilibria with σ(WL) σare selected whenever AS.2 holds, and pooling equilibria with σ⁎(Wp⁎) 0
are selected otherwise. It can be readily seen that the sign of the comparative statics results would remain unchanged
if this refinement were used. I would gladly provide these results upon request. They can also be found at http://www.
pabloruizverdu.com/labour technical note.pdf.
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is efficient in all firms and in the asymmetric cases in which unionization is efficient in only
one type of firm.
859P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868If unionization is efficient in both types of firms or only in low-value firms, results are identical
to those that would be obtained under complete information: if unionization is efficient in all
firms, unionization takes place in all with probability one; if unionization is efficient only in low-
value firms, in equilibrium these firms become unionized with probability one, and high-value
firms avoid unionization with certainty. To see why, notice that whenever unionization is efficient
in low-value firms, these firms prefer unionization to paying a wage greater than W L
u−C and
remaining nonunion. Therefore, in any possible equilibrium, it has to be the case that σ(WL)=1.
Thus, if high-value firms setWH=WL, they become unionized with probability one, and if they set
WH≠WL, they reveal their type. In the latter case, they avoid unionization only ifWH≥WHu −C. If
unionization is inefficient in high-value firms, they prefer to set WH
u −C and avoid unionization.
If, on the contrary, unionization is efficient in high-value firms, these firms prefer to trigger
unionization than to pay workers WH
u −C to avoid it.
Asymmetric information causes a departure from the complete information predictions only if
unionization is efficient in high-value firms but not in low-value firms. In this case, under
complete information, unionization would take place in high-value firms but not in low-value
firms. With asymmetric information, however, there typically exist pooling equilibria in which
the probability of unionization is the same for both types of firms. Although a full analysis is
omitted for the sake of brevity, if the pooling wage is low enough, high-value firms do not want to
deviate and trigger unionization despite the increase in value that unionization could generate, and
low-value firms are not able to signal their type credibly without inducing unionization.
Therefore, a modified version of Corollary 2 would hold in this case: asymmetric information
makes the probability of unionization of low-value firms higher and the probability of
unionization of high-value firms lower than their respective values under complete information. It
is interesting to note that, since pooling equilibria may involve a positive probability of
unionization, inefficiencies may emerge both because there is too much (inefficient) unionization
of low-value firms and because there is too little (efficient) unionization of high-value firms.
5. Implications
5.1. Determinants of unionization
The model analyzed in the previous sections yields the following predictions about the
determinants of unionization:
5.1.1. Unions' impact on efficiency
Proposition 1 states that, under complete information, unionization will take place if and only
if it yields a net efficiency gain. Under asymmetric information, inefficient unionization is
possible, but, as Corollary 2 shows, unionization is more likely the smaller its negative effect on
value. Therefore, unionization will be more likely the greater (smaller) the positive (negative)
efficiency effect of unionization.
5.1.2. Costs of unionization to workers
The other main determinant of unionization is the costs of organization to workers. As
expected, the greater these costs, the cheaper it is for firms to avoid unionization and, thus, the less
likely it is that workers organize.
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5.1.3. Profitability
As discussed in the introduction, firm profitability is often taken as a key determinant of
860 P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868unionization. If we let EV≡qVH+ (1−q)VL denote the expected revenues of a group of ex ante
identical firms (with EV=V in the complete information case), and we compare two groups of
firms, A and B, the model implies that the knowledge that EVANEVB does not allow us to predict
that unionization will be more likely in A. Corollary 2, however, shows that, among firms that
appear ex ante identical to workers, unionization will be more likely in those with lower revenues.
Therefore, we should observe ex post a negative relationship between unionization and revenues
among ex ante identical firms (which have the same EV ).
There is, however, a caveat to the prediction that the probability of unionization should be
either constant or decreasing in the level of revenues. Throughout the paper, it has been
assumed that firms are unionizable in the sense that workers may possibly gain by organizing.
If revenues are so low that workers' expected gain from unionization is negative even if they
are offered W=0, one can immediately show that unionization cannot happen in equilibrium.
An increase in revenues may raise the probability of unionization in this case if it translates
into an increase in union wages large enough to make unionization potentially profitable for
workers.
5.1.4. Unions' bargaining strength
Unions' bargaining strength is often referred to as a major factor influencing unionization. If
we measure the union's bargaining strength by the share of the revenues that the union
appropriates for its members, changes in bargaining strength correspond in the model to changes
in W u. For the same reasons as above, an increase in bargaining strength may increase the
probability of unionization for firms in the lower part of the distribution of rents, but there are no a
priori reasons to expect an increase in bargaining strength to affect unionization probabilities
among unionizable firms. It is worth noting that it also follows from this result that one should be
cautious when interpreting union density (the proportion of workers represented by unions) as a
measure of unions' bargaining strength.
5.2. Measurement of union effects
As discussed in the introduction, one of the main problems facing the empirical literature on
the impact of unions is the fact that the union status of firms and workers is likely to be related to
firm characteristics that affect performance or wages, yet are unobservable to the econometrician.
This may result in biased estimates whose interpretation depends on underlying theories of
unionization. For example, it is commonly argued in empirical work that unions are more likely to
organize more profitable firms and, therefore, that the estimates of the impact of unionization on
profits, which are generally negative, underestimate the true effect of unions. The same reasoning
would imply that the union wage premium is overestimated.
The model in this paper has two main implications concerning the measurement of union effects.
The first one is that we should indeed expect unionization to be correlated with firm characteristics that
are inherently unobservable to the researcher, but that affect wages and firm performance. In particular,
the model shows that unionization will be more likely in firms with lower revenues precisely when
firms' ability to generate revenues cannot be observed by workers and, thus, probably not by the
researcher either. Thus, biases due to underlying differences between union and nonunion firms may
not be easy to eliminate. The second implication is that the resulting biases will have a definite sign.
Since unionization is more likely in firms that would pay lower wages and generate lower rents,
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standard estimates will underestimate the positive effect of unions on wages and overestimate (in
absolute terms) the negative effect of unions on profits.10
861P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 8685.3. Union wage premium and unionization
The union wage premium is often attributed a key causal role in the determination of
unionization, either by encouraging unionization or employer resistance to it. In the model
presented here, however, unionization and the union wage premium are simultaneously
determined in equilibrium. As a result, we cannot talk of a causal effect of the wage premium on
unionization. We can, however, analyze the joint behavior of the probability of unionization and
the estimated wage gap in equilibrium. To do this, suppose that there is a population of ex ante
identical firms and that the same equilibrium holds at all firms. With this assumption, we can
estimate the union wage premium asWG=w u−w n, where w u is the average wage of those firms
that become unionized in equilibrium, and w n the average wage of those that remain nonunion.11
Assuming for simplicity, as in Section 4.2, that whenever pooling equilibria are possible, σ⁎(Wp⁎)=0,
there is unionization in equilibrium only when equilibria are separating. At these equilibria, σ⁎(WL⁎)=
σ and σ⁎(WH⁎)=0. Thus, w
u=wL
u and, letting c denote the costs of organization per worker,
w n ¼ qðw
u
H−cÞ þ ð1−qÞð1− rÞðwuL−cÞ
qþ ð1−qÞð1− rÞ ¼
qwuH þ ð1−qÞð1− rÞwuL
qþ ð1−qÞð1− rÞ −c ð2Þ
WG ¼wu−wn ¼ c− qðw
u
H−w
u
LÞ
qþ ð1−qÞð1− rÞ ð3Þ
Recalling that σ is decreasing in c, it follows that WG is increasing in c.12 Since the
probability of unionization ((1−q)σ) is decreasing in c, an increase (reduction) in c, thus,
translates into a lower (higher) probability of unionization and a higher (lower) wage gap.
Therefore, change in the costs of organization will induce a negative correlation between the wage
gap and the probability of unionization. Inspection of (3) and Corollary 2 shows that changes in
wH
u −wLu will also induce a negative correlation between unionization and the wage gap.
If the efficiency gains generated by unionization are not related to revenues, then, with
complete information, the probability of unionization will be independent of revenues as well.
Since in a complete information equilibrium with low- and high-value firms, union firms would
pay wi
u and nonunion firms wi
u−c (i=L, H ), the wage gap would be c if the proportion of firms in
which unionization is efficient (and which become unionized in equilibrium) is the same for both
types. A negative association between the wage premium and the probability of unionization,
induced by changes in c is, thus, likely to emerge as well.
It is worth remarking that an implication of the negative correlation between the wage gap and
the probability of unionization is that it may be misleading to interpret the wage gap as a measure
of unions' ability to organize new establishments.
10 It should be noted, however, that a bias with the conventional sign may emerge if we cannot control for observed
profitability and there is a significant fraction of firms that are not unionizable. Those firms can be expected to be less
profitable and to pay low wages independently of union status.
11 The wage gap is defined, as customary, in terms of wages lowercase and not in terms of total wage bills uppercase
although, given the assumptions of the model, results would be the same if we looked at the wage bill gap.
12 The wage gap in a separating equilibrium may be small and even negative. This result could help explain the findings
of Freeman and Kleiner (1990b) and DiNardo and Lee (2004) that new unionization seems to have no significant effect
on wages when comparing similar firms.
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5.4. Empirical evidence
862 P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868The model presented in this paper implies that: 1) unionization is not likely to be associated
with observable profitability; 2) unionization is more likely in firms with lower unobserved
profitability; 3) unionization is more likely where it can provide efficiency gains; 4) unionization
is more likely where organization costs are lower; 5) the probability of unionization and the union
wage premium are likely to be negatively correlated. These predictions are largely consistent with
the available empirical evidence from the U.S., which is the country whose bargaining framework
most closely resembles the one in the model.13
Regarding the relation of unionization and observed profitability, the only firm-level studies
that I am aware of (Bronars and Deere, 1993; Bronfenbrenner, 1997) find either no or negative
correlation between firm growth or profitability and new unionization, while no clear picture
emerges from more aggregated studies. Not surprisingly, there is no direct evidence on the
relationship between unobserved profitability and unionization, since the role of asymmetric
information in unionization has not been explored empirically.
With respect to the effect that potential efficiency consequences of unionization have on the
probability of organization, there is evidence that unionization is more likely in firms where
working conditions make some form of collective organization efficient (Duncan and Stafford,
1980) and that unionization tends to be followed by the adoption of grievance and promotion
procedures consistent with the governance role of the union (Freeman and Kleiner, 1990b). The
evidence on the productivity effects of unions is, however, mixed (Booth, 1995).
The empirical evidence generally supports the predictions that unionization is less likely when
costs of organization are higher. In particular, the studies that have analyzed the effect of
managerial opposition on unionization generally find a negative effect, although different studies
differ in the magnitude of this effect (see e.g., Freeman and Kleiner, 1990a).
Finally, there seems to exist a negative relation between union wage premia and new
unionization (Freeman, 1986; Linneman et al., 1990; Bratsberg and Ragan, 2002).
6. Conclusion
I have presented a theoretical model of unionization in which firms' union status is derived as
the equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction of optimizing workers and employers. The
model shows that unionization will be more likely in those firms in which unions generate
efficiency gains, supporting efficiency-based explanations of unionization. In fact, in the absence
of informational asymmetries, the effect of unions on surplus, net of the costs of unionization
incurred by workers, is the only determinant of unionization. Factors such as firms' profitability
or unions' bargaining power do not play any causal role in this context.
The nature of managers' tasks, however, suggests that they are likely to be better informed than
workers about their firms' prospects. I have shown that this informational asymmetry may play a
key role in determining unionization. When there is asymmetric information, unionization
becomes possible even if it is inefficient. Contrary to usual presumptions, however, inefficient
unionization is more likely in firms with worse prospects.
13 A full review of the empirical literature on the determinants of union membership is not attempted here. See Schnabel
(2003) for a recent review.
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In the model, the union wage premium and unionization are determined simultaneously in
equilibrium. Since the two variables are likely to move in opposite directions in response to
863P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868changes in parameter values, the model predicts that they will tend to be negatively correlated.
This result is in contrast with the common argument that unionization will be more likely when
the wage premium is high because of a greater demand for union services.
In summary, this paper questions some commonly-held assumptions about the impact on
unionization of factors such as firm profitability or the union wage premium, highlights the effects
of other factors, such as the costs of organization to workers or the efficiency effects of unions,
and shows that asymmetries of information between workers and employers may play an
important role in explaining unionization.
There are, however, important aspects of unionization that have not been addressed in this paper, or
only in reduced form. In particular, the organization process itself has not been analyzed explicitly,
which means that the model cannot shed light on the determinants of the costs of organization.
Similarly, the paper has focused on a setting inwhich both unionization and bargaining take place at the
firm level. Although this setting characterizes well the U.S. and the British labormarkets, more work is
required to understand the determinants of unionization in more centralized systems, such as those
present in most of continental Europe. Further, by focusing on a single firm, I have not investigated the
role of market interactions or of bargaining or organization externalities across firms (emphasized,
among others, by Freeman, 1998). I believe, however, that the framework developed here can be
profitably extended to analyze these and other aspects of unionization.
7. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let σ0(W0) be the probability of rejecting wage W0 in the first period,
and σ(W ) be the probability of unionizing if wage W is offered in the second period.
The result is proven by backward induction. In the last stage, workers' best response is σ⁎ (W )=
1 if WbW u−C; σ⁎ (W )=0 if WNW u−C; and σ(W )⁎∈ [0, 1] if W=W u−C. Therefore, the
firm's expected profits, given σ⁎, if it offers W in the second period are: EΠ(W, σ⁎)=V u−Wu, if
WbWu−C; EΠ(W, σ⁎)=V−W, if W NW u−C; and EΠ(W u−C, σ⁎)=σ⁎ (W u−C)(V u−W u)+
(1−σ⁎ (W u−C))(V−W u+C ).
It follows that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, W⁎≤W u − C, since, if W⁎NW u−C, then
for any W′∈ (W u−C, W⁎), EΠ(W′, σ⁎)=V−W′NV−W⁎=EΠ(W⁎, σ⁎).
Suppose that V u−VbC. In this case, WbWu−C cannot be optimal for the firm, since if
W′=W u−C+ε, then V u−VbC implies that EΠ(W′, σ⁎)=V−W u+C−εNV u−W u=EΠ(W,
σ⁎) for εN0 small enough. Therefore, in equilibrium, W⁎=W u−C.
Now, if σ⁎(W u−C )N0, V u−VbC would again imply that deviating toW=W u−C+ε would
be profitable for the firm for ε small enough. Thus, in equilibrium, σ⁎ (W u−C )=0.
Given σ⁎ and W⁎, and assuming that workers' outside option is zero in both periods, it is
optimal for workers to accept any W0≥−W⁎ in the initial period, and, thus, it is also optimal for
the firm to offerW0⁎=−W⁎. As shown above for σ⁎, σ0⁎(−W⁎)N0 is not possible in equilibrium.
Therefore, if V u−VbC, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is: W0⁎=− (W u−C ) and
W⁎=W u−C; σ0⁎ (W0)=0 if W0≥− (W u−C ) and σ0⁎ (W0)=1 if W0b− (W u−C ); σ⁎ (W )=1 if
WbWu−C; σ⁎ (W )=0 if W≥W u−C.
Suppose now that V u−VNC. Then, for anyW′≥W u−C, EΠ(W′, σ⁎)≤V−W u+CbV u−W u.
Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to trigger unionization by offeringW⁎⁎bW u−C. Since workers
obtainW u−C in the second period, it follows thatW⁎⁎=−(W u−C ). □
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Proof of Proposition 2. I first describe the conditions that must hold at any equilibrium
(separating or pooling) and, then, characterize the set of separating equilibria.
864 P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 8681. Equilibrium strategies in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
Let EU (W, ρ)≡ρ(W )WHu +(1−ρ(W))WLu−C. Then, D.1 in Definition 1 implies that: σ⁎ (W)=0
if EU (W, ρ)bW; σ⁎ (W )=1 if EU (W, ρ)NW; and σ⁎ (W )∈ [0, 1] if EU (W, ρ)=W. Therefore,
σ⁎ (W )=0 for WNWH
u −C and σ⁎ (W )=1 forWbW Lu−C for any ρ.
Let Wi be the wage set by a type-i firm and EΠi (W, σ)≡σ(W)(V iu−W iu)+(1−σ(W ))(Vi−W )
denote the expected profit of a firm of type i if it offers a wage W and workers' strategy is σ. Let
also bW i≡W iu+Vi−V iu denote the wage that guarantees a firm of type i an expected profit EΠi (bW i,
σ)=V i
u−W iu independently of σ. Then, for any WNbW i and any σ(W )b1, EΠi (W, σ)=σ(W )
(V i
u−W iu)+(1−σ(W ))(Vi−W )bViu−W iu=EΠi (bW i,σ). Therefore, in equilibrium,D.2 implies that
W i⁎ can be greater than bW i only if σ⁎ (W i⁎ )=1.
Further, W i⁎NW H
u −C is not possible in equilibrium, since any W′∈ (WHu −C, W i⁎ ) would be
a profitable deviation for a firm of type i (since σ⁎ (W )=0 for any WNWh
u−C ). Therefore, in
equilibrium, W i⁎≤WHu −C, for i=L, H.
Now, D.2 in Definition 1 requires that for any type i and any W:
r4ðWi4ÞðVui −Wui Þ þ ð1−r4ðWi4ÞÞðVi−Wi4Þzr4ðW ÞðVui −Wui Þ þ ð1−r4ðW ÞÞðVi−W Þ ð4Þ
IfW i⁎≤bWi, then AS.1 ensures that (4) holds for anyW≥bWi and any σ⁎. It was shown above that
W i⁎NbWi is possible only if σ⁎ (W i⁎)=1. Again in this case, AS.1 ensures that (4) holds for any
W≥bWi and any σ⁎ (W ). Therefore, it is never profitable to deviate to W≥bWi.
Note that, for WbbW i, (4) can be rewritten as:
r4 Wð ÞzWi4−W þ r4ðWi4ÞðbWi−Wi4ÞbWi−W u ri Wð Þ; i ¼ L;H : ð5Þ
Next, let W ϵ=WH
u −C+ϵ, with ϵN0 (and note that AS.1 implies that, for ϵ small enough
W ϵbbWH). Then, since σ⁎ (Wϵ)=0, for (5) to hold at Wϵ, it must be the case that
Wi4−ðWuH−C þ eÞ þ r4ðWi4Þð bWi−Wi4ÞV 0 ð6Þ
This implies that WH⁎bbWH , since if WH⁎≥bWH the left-hand side of the inequality for i=H
becomes bWH− (WHu −C+ϵ) (recall that if WH⁎NbWH, then σ⁎(WH⁎)=1), which, for ϵ small enough,
is positive if AS.1 holds. Now, since (6) must hold for any ϵN0, then if Wi⁎bbWi:
r4 Wi4ð ÞVW
u
H−C−Wi4bWi−Wi4 ¼ WuH−C−Wi4Wui þ Vi−Vui −Wi4 ð7Þ
Since WH⁎bbWH, it follows from this expression and AS.1 that, in any PBE, σ⁎(WH⁎ )b1.
2. Separating equilibria. At a separating equilibrium, WH⁎≠WL⁎, so D.3 in Definition 1
implies that ρ⁎ (WH⁎)=1 and ρ⁎ (WL⁎ )=0. It follows from ρ⁎ (WH⁎ )=1 and σ⁎ (WH⁎ )b1 that
WH⁎≥WHu −C. Since we already know that WH⁎≤WHu −C, then, at any separating equilibrium,
WH⁎=WH
u −C. Further, substituting WH⁎=WHu −C into (7):
r4 WH4ð ÞV W
u
H−C−ðWuH−CÞ
WuH þ VH−VuH−ðWuH−CÞ
¼ 0; ð8Þ
so, at any separating equilibrium σ⁎ (WH⁎)=0.
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Next, I check that high-value firms do not want to deviate from WH⁎. From σ⁎ (WH⁎)=0, it
follows that EΠ (W ⁎, σ⁎ )NEΠ (W, σ⁎ ) for any WNW⁎. Further, AS.1 implies that, for any
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WbW L
u−C, EΠH (WH⁎, σ⁎)=VH−WHu+CNVHu−WHu=EΠH (W, σ⁎). So, it only rests to check
that (5) holds for W∈ [WLu−C, WH⁎):
r4 Wð Þz rH Wð Þ ¼ WH
4−W þ r4ðWH4ÞðbWH−WH4ÞbWH−W ¼ WuH−C−WWuH þ VH−VuH−W N 0 ð9Þ
Now, we know that at any equilibrium WL⁎≤WHu −C. Further, since WH⁎=WHu −C and the
equilibrium is separating, it follows that WL⁎bWH
u −C. Therefore, (9) implies that σ⁎ (WL⁎)N0,
which requires WL⁎≤ρ⁎ (WL⁎)(WHu −C)+ (1−ρ⁎(WL⁎))(W Lu−C)=W Lu−C, where the last equality
follows from ρ⁎(WL⁎)=0. Therefore, WL⁎≤W Lu −C.
I will first analyze equilibria withWL⁎=W L
u−C. In this case, it follows from (9) that for a high-
value firm not to deviate and set WL⁎:
r4 WL4ð Þz W
u
H−WuL
WuH−WuL þ VH−VuH þ C
u r ð10Þ
Next, I check that low-value firms do not want to deviate from WL⁎. It was shown above that
deviating to W≥bWL can never be profitable. Similarly, σ⁎ (W )=1 for WbW Lu−C implies that
deviations to WbW L
u−C are not profitable. Thus, it only rests to check (5):
r4 Wð Þz rL Wð Þ ¼ W
u
L−C−W þ r4ðWL4ÞðVL−VuL þ CÞ
WuL þ VL−VuL−W
; for W a WuL−C;bWL  ð11Þ
If WH⁎≤bWL, σ⁎ (WH⁎)≥σL(WH⁎) and σ⁎ (WH⁎)=0 imply that σL (WH⁎ )≤0 and, thus, that:
r4 WL4
 
V
WuH−C−WL4
WuL þ VL−VuL−WL4
¼ W
u
H−W
u
L
VL−VuL þ C
ur ð12Þ
Therefore, if WH⁎≤bWL, (10) and (12) imply that σ≤σ⁎ (WL⁎ )≤σ. Hence, if WH⁎≤bWL, a
separating equilibrium can exist only if σ≤σ, which holds if and only if:
WuH−W
u
L þ VH−VuH þ CzVL−VuL þ C; ð13Þ
which is just assumption AS.2 (and can be rewritten bWH≥bWL). Further, if WH⁎NbWL, then AS.1
implies AS.2. Therefore, AS.2 must hold at any separating equilibrium.
Equilibria with WL⁎bW L
u−C require σ⁎(WL⁎)=1. Therefore, at these equilibria, WL⁎ is not a
profitable deviation for a high-value firm. Further, since σ⁎ (WL⁎)=1 implies that σL (W )=1 for
WbbWL−C (from (11)), (5) requires that σ⁎ (W)=1 forWbbWL. Therefore, ifWH⁎bbWL, equilibria
with WL⁎bW L
u−C are not possible, since σ⁎ (WH⁎)=0. If WH⁎≥bWL, however, these equilibria are
possible as long as σ⁎ (W )=1 for WbbWL, and (9) holds for W∈ [bWL, WH⁎).
Finally, note that for σ⁎ (W )N0 to be optimal for workers for any W∈ (W Lu−C, WHu −C ), it
has to be the case that ρ⁎(W )WH
u +(1−ρ⁎(W ))W Lu−C≥W, that is,
q4 Wð ÞzW−W
u
L þ C
WuH−WuL
uqm Wð Þ; ð14Þ
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It follows that:
866 P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 8681. If AS.2 does not hold, σNσ and WH
u −CbbWL, so there are no separating equilibria.
2. If AS.2 holds, then [σ⁎, (WL⁎, WH⁎), ρ⁎] is a PBE if: i) WL⁎=W L
u−C and WH⁎=WHu −C ;
ii) σ⁎(W )=0 for W≥WH⁎, σ⁎(W )=1 for WbWL⁎, σ⁎ (WL⁎)∈ [σ, min{1, σ}], and σ⁎
(W )≥max{σL(W), σH(W )} otherwise; iii) ρ⁎ (WL⁎)=0, ρ⁎ (WH⁎)=1, ρ⁎ (W )≥ρm (W )
for W∈ (WL⁎, WH⁎) (with ρ⁎ (W )=ρm(W ) if σ⁎ (W )b1), and ρ⁎ (W )∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
3. If AS.2 andWH
u −CbbWL, there are no separating equilibria other than the ones described above.
If WH
u −C≥bWL, there are also separating equilibria with: i)WL⁎bWLu−C, WH⁎=WHu −C; ii) σ⁎
(W ) =1 for WbbWL, σ⁎ (W )≥σH (W ), for W∈ [bWL, WH⁎) and σ⁎ (W )=0 for W≥WH⁎;
iii) ρ⁎ (WL⁎) =0, ρ⁎ (WH⁎) =1, ρ⁎ (W)≥ρm (W ) for W∈ [W Lu−C, WH⁎) (with ρ⁎ (W )=ρm
(W ) if σ⁎ (W )b1), and ρ⁎ (W )∈ [0, 1] otherwise. □
Proof of Proposition 3. At a pooling equilibrium,WL⁎=WH⁎=Wp⁎, so it follows from σ⁎ (WH⁎)b1
(see inequality (7)) that σ⁎ (Wp⁎)b1, which implies that Wp⁎≤min{bWL, bWH} (since Wi⁎NbW i is
possible only if σ⁎ (Wi⁎)=1. Since we know that in equilibrium Wi⁎≤WHu−C, it follows that
Wp⁎≤min{bWL, bWH, WHu −C}. Further, σ⁎ (W p⁎)b1 requires EU(Wp⁎,ρ⁎)≤Wp⁎. Since D.3
requires ρ⁎ (Wp⁎)=q, this last inequality becomes qWH
u +(1−q)W Lu −C≡Wp≤Wp⁎. Therefore, a
necessary condition for a pooling equilibrium to exist is Wp≤min{bWL, bWH, WHu−C}. Since
WpbWH
u−C, and AS.1 implies WHu−CbbWH, this condition will hold if and only if Wp≤bWL,
which, rearranging, becomes condition (1):
VL−ðqWuH þ ð1−qÞWuL−CÞzVuL−WuL ð1Þ
Note that if bWLNbWH, that is, if AS.2 does not hold, then Wp≤bWL, since WpbWHu −CbbWH.
Thus, if bWLNbWH, then (1) holds.
. If WL⁎=WH⁎=Wp⁎, σL and σL, defined in the no-deviation condition (5), become:
ri Wð Þ ¼
Wp4−W þ r4ðWp4ÞðbWi−Wp4ÞbWi−W ; for any WVbWi; i ¼ L;H : ð15Þ
Therefore, if bWHNbWL (i.e., if AS.2 holds), σL(W )NσH (W ) for WbWp⁎, and σL(W )bσH (W ) for
WNWp⁎. If bWHbbWL (i.e., if AS.2 does not hold), the inequalities are reversed.
1. Suppose first that AS.2 holds (bWLbbWH). If (1) does not hold, there are no pooling
equilibria. If (1) holds, then, to guarantee that no firm type wants to deviate toWbWp⁎, it suffices
to check that σ⁎ (W )≥σL(W ). ForW∈ (Wp⁎,WHu −C], it suffices to check that σ⁎ (W )≥σH(W ).
Finally, for no wageWNWH
u −C to be a profitable deviation, condition (7) must hold for both firm
types. Since bWL≤bWH , it suffices to check that:
r4 Wp4
 
V
WuH−C−Wp4bWH−Wp4 ¼ WuH−C−Wp4WuH þ VH−VuH−Wp4u r1; ð16Þ
where σ1b1 because of AS.1.
Thus, if AS.2 and (1) hold, [σ⁎, (Wp⁎,Wp⁎), ρ⁎] is a PBE if and only if: i)Wp≤Wp⁎≤min{bWL,
W H
u −C}; ii) σ⁎ (W)=0 forWNW Hu −C , σ⁎ (W )=1 for WbW Lu−C, σ⁎ (Wp⁎)=0 ifWp⁎NWp and
σ⁎ (Wp⁎)∈ [0, σ1] if Wp⁎=Wp, σ⁎ (W)≥σL(W ) for W∈ [WLu−C, Wp⁎), and σ⁎ (W)≥σH(W) for
W∈ (Wp⁎, WHu −C]; iii) ρ⁎ (Wp⁎)=q, ρ⁎(W )≥ρm (W ) for W∈ (W Lu −C, WHu −C ), and ρ⁎
(W )∈ [0, 1] otherwise, for ρm defined in (14) (with ρ⁎ (W )=ρm(W ) if σ⁎ (W )b1).
2. Suppose now that AS.2 does not hold (i.e., bWLNbWH ). Then, it was shown above that (1)
holds. To guarantee that there are no profitable deviations for either type of firm, it now suffices to
19
check that, for WbWp⁎, σ⁎ (W )≥σH(W ) and, for W∈ (Wp⁎, WHu −C ], σ⁎ (W )≥σL(W ). To
guarantee that no wage WNW u −C can be a profitable deviation, Ŵ NŴ implies that we only
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need to check that condition (7) holds for low-value firms:
r4 Wp4
 
V
WuH−C−Wp4bWL−Wp4 ¼ WuH−C−Wp4WuL þ VL−VuL−Wp4u r2 ð17Þ
Therefore, if AS.2 does not hold, [σ⁎, (Wp⁎, Wp⁎), ρ⁎] is a PBE if and only if: i) Wp⁎∈ [Wp,
WH
u −C]; ii) σ⁎ (W )=0 for WNWHu −C, σ⁎ (W )=1 for WbW Lu−C, σ (Wp⁎)=0 if Wp⁎NWp and
σ⁎ (Wp⁎)∈ [0, σ2] if Wp⁎=Wp, σ⁎ (W )≥σH (W ) for W∈ [WLu−C, Wp⁎), and σ⁎ (W )≥σL(W ) for
W∈ (Wp⁎, WHu −C ]; iii) ρ⁎ (Wp⁎)=q; ρ⁎ (W )≥ρm(W ) for W∈ (W Lu −C, WHu −C ) (with ρ⁎
(W )=ρm(W ) if σ⁎ (W )b1), and ρ⁎ (W)∈ [0, 1], otherwise.
Note that if Wp⁎NWp, then it must be the case that, for W′∈ (Wp, Wp⁎), ρ⁎ (W′)Nρ⁎ (Wp⁎)=q.
To see this, notice that if ρ(W′)≤q, then σ⁎ (W′)=0 (since W′NWp), so W′ would be a profitable
deviation. □
References
Booth, A., 1985. The free rider problem and a social custom model of trade union membership. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 100 (1), 253 261.
Booth, A.L., 1995. The Economics of the Trade Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
Bratsberg, B., Ragan, J.F., 2002. Changes in the union wage premium by industry. Industrial and Labor Relations Review
56 (1), 65 83.
Bronars, S.G., Deere, D.R., 1993. Union organizing activity, firm growth and the business cycle. American Economic
Review 83 (1), 203 220.
Bronfenbrenner, K., 1997. The role of union strategies in NLRB certification elections. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 50 (2), 195 212.
Corneo, G., 1995. Social custom, management opposition, and trade union membership. European Economic Review 39
(2), 275 292.
Corneo, G., Lucifora, C., 1997. Wage formation under union threat effects: Theory and empirical evidence. Labour
Economics 4 (1), 265 292.
DiNardo, J., Lee, D.S., 2004. Economic impacts of new unionization on private sector employers: 1984 2001. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (4), 1383 1441.
Duncan, G.J., Stafford, F.P., 1980. Do union members receive compensating wage differentials? American Economic
Review 70 (3), 355 371.
Farber, H.S., 1990. The decline in unionism in the united states: What can be learned from recent experience. Journal of
Labor Economics 8 (1), S75 S105.
Farber, H.S., 2005.Nonunionwage rates and the threat of unionization. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (3), 335 352.
Freeman, R.B., 1986. The effect of the union wage differential on management opposition and union organizing success.
American Economic Review 76 (2), 92 96.
Freeman, R.B., 1998. Spurts in union growth: Defining moments and social processes. In: Bordo, M.D., Goldin, C., White,
E.N. (Eds.), The Defining Moment: the Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century. The
Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Freeman, R.B., Kleiner, M.M., 1990a. Employer behavior in the face of union organizing drives. Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 43 (4), 351 365.
Freeman, R.B., Kleiner, M.M., 1990b. The impact of new unionization on wages and working conditions. Journal of Labor
Economics 8 (1), S8 S25.
Freeman, R.B., Medoff, J.L., 1984. What Do Unions Do? Basic Books, New York.
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Horn, H.,Wolinsky, A., 1988.Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation. The Economic Journal 98 (391), 484 497.
Kennan, J., Wilson, R., 1993. Bargaining with private information. Journal of Economic Literature 31 (1), 45 104.
Lazear, E., 1983. A competitive theory of monopoly unionism. American Economic Review 73 (4), 631 643.
Linneman, P., Wachter, M.L., Carter, W.H., 1990. Evaluating the evidence on union employment and wages. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 44 (1), 34 53.
20
Naylor, R., Cripps,M., 1993.An economic theory of the open shop trade union. EuropeanEconomicReview37 (8), 1599 1620.
Naylor, R., Raaum, O., 1993. The open shop union, wages, and management opposition. Oxford Economic Papers 45 (4),
868 P. Ruiz-Verdú / Labour Economics 14 (2007) 848 868589 604.
Schnabel, C., 2003. Determinants of trade union membership. In: Addison, J.T., Schnabel, C. (Eds.), International
Handbook of Trade Unions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 13 43.
Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York.21
